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against the seller. Except as to those defenses which may be asserted
against a holder in due course, this agreement may be enforced by an
assignee for value who takes in good faith and without notice of a claim
or defense. It should be noted that this section is expressly made subject
to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers of
"consumer goods." "Consumer goods" are defined as those goods used, or
bought for use, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.49
While the Code appears- to recognize the need for a different rule in the
case of "consumer goods," as opposed to those transactions between merchants, it expressly makes no effort to solve the basic problem of whether
a finance company should be given the benefit of holder in due course
status.5 0
In conclusion, it is submitted that the courts can best serve the interest
of justice by adopting a reasonable standard to govern the determination of
good faith on the part of finance companies in the conditional sales contract-promissory note situation. Where the claim of defense assertable against
the dealer is groundless, the finance company should be able to prevail in
a trial on the merits. If the claim is valid, however, the finance company
should not be considered insulated from the claim where it has so involved
itself with the business of the dealer that it may not, in the eyes of justice,
be deemed a true holder in due course. As stated in a New York case,
"...
if any hardship is imposed by this rule, it is only the hardship that has
always followed the refusal of the law to permit the divorce of honor from
enterprise." 1
JOHN E. STANFIELD

SALE WARRANTIES UNDER WYOMING LAW
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The sales warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code1 are in
many ways similar to the sales warranties contained in the Uniform Sales
Act; however, there are significant differences that are worthwhile to note.
This article will attempt to illustrate, by comparison, some of the more
important differences between the two uniform acts. The comparison
will actually be between existing Wyoming law and the Code since the
2
Uniform Sales Act is law in Wyoming.
There seems to be little change in the Code with respect to the express
warranty, and the implied warranties of title, sale by sample and sale by
49.
50.

51.
1.
2.

Uniform Commercial Code § 9-109(1).
See Uniform Commercial Code § 9-206, comment (2) (Uniform Laws Annoted 1958)
in which it is stated: "This article takes no position on the controversial question
whether a buyer of consumer goods may effectively waive defenses by contractual
clause or by execution of a negotiable note."
Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, supra note 46, at 786.
Hereinafter called the Code.
The warranty provisions of the Sales Act can be found in W.S. § 34-177 through
§ 34-181. The warranty provisions of the Code are found in § 2-312 through § 2-318..

NOTES

description. Differences are more apparent in the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Significant changes
appear in the Code in its provisions for regulating the conflicts between
express warranties and disclaimers and conflicts between express and
implied warranties. Finally, the Code rejects the requirement of privity
in actions for breach of warranty in certain cases. These matters will be
discussed in this order.
The express warranty, " implied warranty of sale by sample,4 and by
description 5 are grouped under one express warranty section of the Code.6
The warranties of description and sample are designated as express rather
than implied warranties since they rest on the "dickered" aspects of the
individual bargain and go to the essence of the bargain. As express warranties they are less vulnerable to words of disclaimer in a standard printed
form.7 The express warranty does not extend to "sales puffs" by a seller.
It is recognized that a seller's expression of value or his opinion of the
goods does not form a part of the bargain."
The Code purports to completely revise the warranty of title section
of the Uniform Sales Act.9 The warranty of quiet possession is omitted
entirely but it is inherent in the general warranty of good title. 10 Even
so, one writer feels that this warranty will be lost under the Code since it is
not specifically provided for and since other sections of the Code appear to
be in conflict with its preservation.
It omits any warranty of quiet possession which is specifically
provided for in Section 12 (2) of the Uniform Sales Act. In view
of the provision in Section 2-725 (2) that "A breach of warranty
occurs when tender of delivery is made," this is a serious deficiency
in the Code. Quiet possession may not be disturbed for some time
after delivery, and Section 2-725 (1) sets a short Statute of Limitations of four years and, by agreement, a still shorter one of "not
less than one year.""'
The warranty of title section of the Code would provide a warranty
of title to a buyer of a patent.' 2 It has been suggested that the warranty
of quiet possession in the Uniform Sales Act is broad enough to protect
such a buyer and a specific warranty is unnecessary.' 3
The present Wyoming law provides for an implied warranty of mer3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

W.S. § 34-177.
W.S. § 34-181.
W.S. § 34-179.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313, Comment 1.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313 (2).
W.S. § 34-178.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312, Comment 1.
Hall, Article 2-Sales-From Status to Contract?, Wis. L. Rev. 209 (1952).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312 (3).
Goodwin, How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code would affect the
Law of Sales in Oregon, 30 Ore. L. Rev. 212 (1951). "However, despite the absence
of authority upon the point, it is believed that the wording of the warranty of
quiet possession in the Uniform Sales Act is broad enough to protect a buyeg
against liability of patentees."
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chantable quality but does not attempt to define "merchantable quality."' 14

The Code contains a similar implied warranty but is more specific in its
treatments of it.'5 The Code energetically enumerates qualities and attributes of the term "merchantable."' 6 This enumeration does not purport
to exhaust the meaning of "merchantable" nor to limit the definition, but,

on the contrary, the intention is to leave open other attributes of merchantability. At the very least, such a definition would create a certainty
that is not present in our present implied warranty of merchantable
quality. This warranty is further delimited by a clear definition of the
word "merchant."' 7 The Uniform Sales Act does not define "merchant"
and, in fact,
•.. only in the doctrine of warranty of merchantability does the
text of the present Uniform Sales Act contain special provisions for
a "seller who deals in goods of that description" (Section 15 (2)) .18
It can be seen that the implied warranty of merchantability under the
Code is restricted to a much smaller group than everyone who is engaged
in business since it requires a professional status on the part of the seller
as to particular kinds of goods. For instance, a person making an isolated
sale of goods is not a "merchant" within the meaning of the full scope of
this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply. 19
Our present statute does not contain an implied warrianty as to fitness
for any particular purpose except where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
are required.2 0 In dealing with this same implied warranty, the Code
would extend it to the situation where the seller at the time of contracting
has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are
21
required.
Under our present law, therefore, the buyer has the burden to make
14.
15.

W.S. § 34-.180(2).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314. The principal warranty in this section is found
in subsection (1) wherein '. .. a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable
is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind."

16.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314 (2) . "Goods to be merchantable must be at least
such as (a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are a fair average quality within the description;
and (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and (d)
run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and (e) are adequately
contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and (f) conform
to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any."

17.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-104.

Merchant is defined as "a person who deals

in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transactions
or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skill."

18.
19.

20.
21.

Rabcl, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 t1. of Chi. L. Rev. 427
(1950).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314, Comment 3.
W.S. § 34-180(1).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315.

NOTES

known the particular purpose of the goods for the warranty to attach;
whereas, the Code would charge the seller with knowledge of the particular
purpose if he had reason to know at the time of the contracting. This
slight charge of emphasis in the Code would seem to be to the buyer's
benefit since under this section the buyer need not bring home to the
seller actual knowledge of the particular purpose for which the goods are
22
intended.
In Salt Lake Hardware Co. v. Connell2 3 our court dealt with our
present statute on implied warranty as to fitness for any particular purpose. In that case, the buyer, Mrs. Connell, wished to purchase an oil
still for refining oil recovered from wells located at Spring Valley in Unita
County. She made a trip to Salt Lake City to arrange for the purchase of
the still. The Western Heating and Sheet Metal Works of Salt Lake City,
after hearing of her needs and purposes of such a still, agreed to construct
it for her. When she returned to Wyoming she received a letter of specifications for the still from the metal works. She signed her name below the
typewritten word "accepted" and returned the letter. The letter stated that
"all labor and material guaranteed to be strictly first class." The still
was delivered and assembled but did not function properly and condemned
by the State Oil and Gas Inspector as being wasteful and impractical. The
assignee of the metal works sued her for the balance of the purchase price
of the oil still. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision for
the buyer and found that an implied warranty as to fitness for a particular
purpose existed. After quoting what is now Wyoming Statutes 34-180 (1),
the court said:
In order that the exceptions set out in the excerpt quoted hereinabove from the statute shall be operative, it is obvious from the
language used that two things must appear in evidence: first, that
the seller was informed, expressly or by implication, of the purpose
second, that the buyer
for which the goods were purchased; and
24
relied on the seller's skill and judgment.
Under present Wyoming law there is no implied warranty as to fitness
for any particular purpose in the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a
specified article under its patent or trade name.225 The Code would extend
the warranty of fitness to include such transaction.2 6 This would be a
recognition of the trend in case law which holds a seller to an implied
warranty of fitness notwithstanding the fact that the sale was of an article
27
under its patent or trade name.
The Uniform Sales Act does not resolve the conflict between express
warranties and disclaimer clause. 2 8

The Code meets this problem and

22.
23.
24.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315, Comment I.
47 Wyo. 145,.34 P.2d 23 (1933).
Ibid. at 156, 34 P.2d at 26.

25.

W.S. § 34-180(4).

27.
28.

Williston, Sales § 236a (rev.ed. 1948).
Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817 (3rd Cir. 1951),
footnote 9.

26.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315, Comment 5.
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provides that where there is a conflict between an express warranty and a
disclaimer clause, the negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that such construction is unreasonable.2 ". This provision is designed to
protect the buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer.3" To further this general policy, a disclaimer must be in writing
and conspicuous or it will be ineffective. The section also sets forth
language effecting a disclaimer.A' On the other hand, the Code protects
the seller against false allegations of oral warranties by its provisions on
parol and extrinsic evidence, 32 and against unauthorized representations
by the customary "lack of authority" clauses. 33
It is interesting to note that one year before the Uniform Sales Act
was adopted in Wyoming, our Supreme Court sustained an oral warranty
34
over a disclaimer clause contained in a bill of sale. In Leitner v. Thayer,
the seller was seeking to recover upon three notes given in the purchase of
a stallion. The buyer admitted signing the notes and inter alia contended
that the seller verbally warranted the stallion was in good health "and
would get sixty per cent of mares bred to him with foal, and was a good
foal getter."35, The seller agreed that the stallion was warranted to be a
sixty per cent foal getter but argued that the only warranty their agent
who made the sale was authorized to give was a written warranty, and that
a bill of sale, a purported copy of which was admitted in evidence, and
which the seller claimed was delivered to the buyer, was the only warranty
given. The bill of sale contained the following disclaimer clause:
This Bill of Sale contains all the agreements of warranty of
guarantee made by us in the sale of the above mentioned stallion,
and it is expressly provided that we shall not be liable for any
claim that may hereafter be made alleging any verbal agreement
of ourselves or agent in the sale of said horse.36
The court, while holding on another point, said:
There was sufficient evidence
that the warranty was verbal,
delivered; and the warranty
stantially that which plaintiffs
37

to make and did make.

to sustain the finding of the jury
and that no written warranty was
as claimed by defendants is subadmitted the agent was authorized

At common law38 and under the Uniform Sales Act,3 9 implied warranties can be disclaimed. In the case of InternationalHarvester Company
of America v. LeiferA0 the company sued the buyer of a truck for the
29.
30.
31.
52.
33.
34.
35.

Uniform Commercial Code 1 2-316(1).
Uniform Commerical Code § 2-316, Comment 1.
Uniform Commercial Code J 2-316(2).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316, Comment 2.
24 Wyo. 378. 159 Pac. 1084 (1916).
Ibid. at 380, 159 Pac. at 1084.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 382. 159 Pac. at 1085.
Id. at 385, 159 Pac. at 1086.
Williston, Sales 1 213 (rev.ed. 1948).
W.S. § 34-161.

40.

42 Wyo. 283, 293 Pac. 581 (1930).

Noms
balance tiue to foreclose the chattel mortgage thereon. The buyer relied
on an oral express warranty not included in the written contract of sale.
The sales order for the truck stated that "the purchaser agreed that this
order contains the entire agreement" and on the reverse of the order the
warranty was set out and below that these words appeared: "The above
warranties are in lieu of all other warranties express or implied and no
4
." 1
person, agent or dealer is authorized to give any other warranties ....
The buyer claimed the agent, in making the sale, orally agreed that the
truck would be delivered with an enclosed cab and wheels of a certain
size. The truck was delivered to the buyer without the enclosed cab and
special wheels, but he took delivery on the promise of the local dealer that
the cab and wheels would be supplied later. The court held, without
relying on statutory authority,4 2 that
. . . the trial court was correct in excluding proof of an express
oral warranty not contained, of course, in the written contract of
the parties-first, because the defendant (buyer) knew and agreed,
when he signed the written order, that the plaintiff's (seller)
agents had no authority to make any other warranty than as expressed in the writing, and secondly, because to have allowed the
introduction of such testimony would, under the circumstances,
43
have resulted in a plain violation of the parol evidence rule.
The Code treats the subject of cumulation and conflict of express and
implied warranties with more certainty than our present law. The Uniform
Sales Act handles the matter by generally stating than an express warranty
44
does not negative an implied warranty unless it is inconsistent therewith.
The Code makes it clear that on the question of inconsistency between
express and implied warranties, any question of fact as to which warranty
was intended by the parties must be resolved in favor of the express warranty, except that the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose will
45
prevail over all other warranties.
In the Connell case, 46 previously discussed, the court found no inconsistency in the express warranty in the letter of specifications and the
implied warranty of fitness:
It will be recalled that, in the case at bar, the Metal Works gave
Mrs. Connell an express warranty of good workmanship. It is
evident, under the statute, that this in no way conflicted or interferred with the operation of the implied warranty hereinabove
47
mentioned.
41.

Ibid. at 288, 293 Pac. at 382.

42.

W.S. § 34-161, which says: "Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a

43.
44.
45.

contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by
express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if
the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract of the sale."
Supra note 40 at 293, 293 Pac. at 384.
W.S. § 34-180(6).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315, Comment 2 and Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-317 (c).
47 Wyo. 145, 34 P.2d 23 (1933).
Ibid. at 160, 34 P.2d at 28.

46.
47.
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At common law the liability of a warrantor was contractual and, therefore, would run directly between the purchaser and his immediate seller.4 8

*The Uniform Sales Act does not treat this problem and Wyoming has no
cases on this point. Recent cases have rejected the requirement of'privity,
at least, in food cases. In Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co.,491 the
court followed the privity rule but recognized the fact that twelve states
have rejected it in cases involving food.
The Code has recognized this trend and gives the buyer's family,
household and guests the benefit of the same warranty which the buyer
received in the contract of sale, thereby rejecting the privity rule. 50
CONCLUSION

The CoLe would be an improvement over the Uniform Sales Act. It
would give more certainty to the law of warranties; it would codify certain
troubled areas in case law; and it would be beneficial to the buyer and
seller alike.
The law of warranties is more certain under the Code. A disclaimer
clause is inoperative as against an express warranty if it would be unreasonable. In the event that express and implied warranties are in
conflict, the express warranty is favored except that the implied warranty
of fitness will prevail over all. The warranty of merchantability is more
clearly defined than it is under the Uniform Sales Act. The use of and
the requirements for a disclaimer are more definitely prescribed.
The Code broadens the scope of the Uniform Sales Act. It provides
for a seller "puffing" his goods. The warranty of fitness extends to articles
sold under their patent or trade name. The Code also gives the buyer's
family, household and guests the benefit of the same warranty which the
buyer received in the contract of sale.
The seller would benefit from the provisions that would make his
dealings with his customer- more certain. The recognition of the "sales
puff," the protection from false allegations of oral warranties and definite
guides to make effective disclaimers, are all safeguards for him.
The buyer would benefit from the extension of the warranty of fitness
to include purchases of patent or other trade name goods. Another advantage would be the extension of the buyer's warranty to his family, household and guests for goods reasonably expected to be used or consumed by
them. The rules requiring conspicuous disclosure of disclaimer clauses
would be an obvious protection and advantage to the buyer.
DONALD P. WHIEr
48.
Williston, Sales § 244a (rev.ed. 1948).
48.-. 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955).
50.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318, Comment 2.

